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3.3 WAGE LEVELS, MANIFEST SHORTAGE, PLANNED  
AND ACTUAL PAY RISES
János Köllő, László Reszegi & István János Tóth
This chapter explores the link between the wage levels in the business sec-
tor and “manifest” shortages (already created but unfilled jobs as well as ex-
isting capacities unused due to the lack of skilled or unskilled workers) on the 
one hand, and how shortage affected planned and actual wage increases, on 
the other hand. We presume that firms paying wages below the market rate 
are more likely to complain of labour shortage and that firms facing shortages 
have a stronger tendency to raise wages, if they can afford it.
These questions can only be examined using a smaller sample – the database 
created by merging the 2015 HLMF1 and the 2015 and 2016 Wage Surveys. 
Since only companies participating in all three surveys may be included in the 
analysis, the number of cases is smaller and may change in accordance with 
the presence of certain enterprise characteristics.
Wage levels and shortage
The wage levels in the business sector were assessed using the residual average 
wage estimate based on the data of the Wage Surveys. First, wage equations 
were estimated on workers in the for-profit sector using the 2015 Wage Sur-
vey and the following explanatory variables: gender, labour market experi-
ence and its square, the estimated number of years spent in education, sector, 
firm size and the county in which the plant is based. The equations were es-
timated for the total sample and separately for the low qualified (completing 
fewer than 10 grades) and qualified (completing more) subgroups. Then the 
enterprise-level residual average wage was determined as the company aver-
age of the differences between the observed and predicted individual wages. 
Wages were measured in logarithmic form.
Positive average residual wage means that a company pays its employees bet-
ter than the level expected on the basis of the above variables, while negative 
residual average wage means that it pays below the wage level expected on the 
basis of workforce composition and enterprise characteristics.
The average values of shortage indicators and the number of companies in 
this sample is presented in Table 3.3.1. Using linear (OLS) regressions and 
binary probit models, we estimated how underutilisation related to residual 
wage levels in 2015. It was explored how the higher or lower level of residual 
wage affected the shortage indicators such as the incidence and proportion 
of persistently unfilled vacancies as well as the incidence and extent of idle 
capacity attributable to labour shortage. Because of the small number of cases, 
equations were only controlled for one further dummy variable, measuring 
1 The Hungarian Labour Market 
Forecast is the online database 
of the joint, national labour 
market survey of the National 
Ministry for Economy and the 
Institute for Economic and En-
terprise Research of the Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry.
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the occurrence of investment. The results are presented, along with a detailed 
explanation, in Table 3.3.2.
Table 3.3.1: The average of shortage indicators and the number of cases  
in the sample analysed in this chapter
Percentage Cases
Presence of persisting vacancies 16.7 1539
Proportion of persisting vacancies 0.7 1539
Unable to fully utilise capacities due to the shortage of skilled workers 15.9 1527
Idle capacity due to the shortage of skilled workers 0.9 1527
Unable to fully utilise capacities due to the shortage of unskilled workers 9.0 965
Idle capacity due to the shortage of unskilled workers 0.5 965
Paying below the wage level expected on the basis of workforce composi-
tion (total staff) 54.3 1539
Paying below the wage level expected on the basis of workforce composi-
tion (skilled workers) 55.4 1527
Paying below the wage level expected on the basis of workforce composi-
tion (unskilled workers) 50.3 965
Source: The merged database of the 2015 HLMF and the Wage Survey.
Table 3.3.2: The impact of the enterprise-level residual wage  
on the occurrence and the value of shortage indicators, 2015,  
probit marginal effects and linear regression coefficients
Impact on shortage indicator
Model cases
residual wageb investmentc
Are there vacancies? (0/1)
–0.008 0.087***
Probit 1539
(0.3) (4.7)
Vacancies (proportion)
–0.058** –0.005
OLS 1539
(2.5) (0.2)
Unable to fully utilise capacities due to the 
shortage of skilled workers (0/1)a
–0.126*** 0.087***
Probit 1527
(3.5) (4.9)
Idle capacity due to the shortage of skilled 
workers (proportion)
–0.119*** 0.076***
OLS 1527
(4.5) (3.0)
Unable to fully utilise capacities due to the 
shortage of unskilled workers (0/1)
–0.013 0.049**
Probit 965
(0.4) (2.4)
Idle capacity due to the shortage of un-
skilled workers (proportion)
–0.035 0.069**
OLS 965
(1.3) (2.3)
a Idle capacity attributable to labour shortage: C = (1 – c)l, where c is the utilisation 
rate of capacity (0 ≤ c ≤ 1) and l is the extent of idle capacity attributable to the 
shortage of skilled and unskilled workers (0 ≤ l ≤1), as reported by companies.
b For estimating the enterprise-level residual average wage, see the main text. The 
first two blocks contain the enterprise-level residual average wage, while the others 
contain the residual wage estimated for the qualification groups.
c Binary variable with a value of 1 if the company made investment in 2015 and 0 if 
they did not make any.
T-values are provided in brackets. Standard errors were calculated using bootstrap 
resampling repeated 100 times. Interpreting the coefficients in the OLS (ordinary 
least square) model: the impact of one standard deviation of residual wage differ-
ence on the shortage indicator, measured in standard deviation units. As for the 
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probit model: marginal effect at the sample mean. Company size was also included 
in the equations; however, its coefficients were close to zero and not significant, 
thus they are not presented here.
Note: Dependent variables: shortage indicators.
*** Significant at a 1 per cent level, ** significant at a 5 per cent level, * significant at a 10 
per cent level.
Source: The merged database of the 2015 HLMF and the Wage Survey.
The results indicate that the coefficients for the residual wage are negative in 
each case, suggesting that manifest shortages occur more often at firms pay-
ing below the market rate. However, effects are significant for only half of 
the indicators included. Strong effects were observed at companies paying 
their skilled workers below the market rate. Considering the estimated mar-
ginal effects (β) and the range of residual wages (σ = 0.29), it is seen that if the 
average enterprise-level wage is one standard deviation unit below the market 
rate, it increases the probability of idle capacity attributable to labour short-
age by βσ ≈ 3.5 percentage points. Results concerning unskilled workers are 
also negative but they are much weaker and not statistically significant. Re-
sults concerning vacancies as shortage indicators are also weaker.
At a given level of residual wage, shortage occurs more frequently and is more 
severe at firms that have made investments. It is important to note though that 
this is more likely to be interdependence than causality, because investment 
may both alleviate or worsen shortage. Additionally, sometimes investments 
are made as a result of shortage.
The opposite relationship between residual wage and complaints of shortage 
would work against the above interpretation. A firm facing shortage would 
probably like to increase wages, not decrease them: this would imply a positive 
relationship between shortage and residual wage. Observing a negative rela-
tionship between residual wages and complaints of shortage clearly indicates 
that there is an opposite effect: shortage arises more often at low-paying firms.
Furthermore, it is possible that wages below the market rate are compensated 
for by non-pecuniary benefits. However, it would be difficult to explain why 
these unobserved non-monetary benefits, such as above-average work condi-
tions, convenient working hours, better promotion prospects and job security 
would entail more frequent and serious complaints of shortages. These factors, 
holding wages equal, tend to reduce the probability of shortage and weaken 
the negative relationship between residual wages and complaints.
Shortages and wage increase
The samples analysed lend themselves to investigating the relationship be-
tween shortage as well as planned and actual wage increases and also how the 
planned and actual increases relate to each other. Corporate intentions are of 
interest in themselves, as they depend not only on factors determining actual 
wage increases but also on the expectations of businesses. Consequently, it 
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cannot be expected even in principle that actual wage increases would equal 
the intended ones. However, it is reasonably expected that the two have a sig-
nificant positive relationship: that companies plan changes in the wages they 
offer taking account of the factors actually influencing their wages.
The analysis relies on the 2015 HLMF and the 2015 and 2016 Wage Sur-
veys. The HLMF survey was conducted in September–October 2015 and it 
provides information on wage increases planned for 2016. The related ques-
tion was as follows: “How is the average wage expected to change in 2016 (in 
nominal value) at your company (site) compared to the previous year?” The fig-
ures for the actual wage increases obtained from the Wage Surveys also con-
cern the increase in average wage between May 2015 and 2016. Although 
the two indicators do not exactly measure the same thing, a strong relation-
ship is presumed between them, since the majority of companies raise wages 
in the first half of the year.
The effect of shortage indicators on planned and actual wage increases is 
evaluated using univariate regressions. We apply robust regression (Stata rreg) 
because of some extreme values in the changes of wage levels, which would 
imply ambiguous results in linear regression.
Table 3.3.3 suggests that it was only the presence and proportion of vacan-
cies as well as the occurrence of idle capacity attributable to the shortages of 
skilled workers that affected 2016 wage increase plans. It may additionally con-
tribute to the positive correlation that some factors (market opening, launch-
ing a new factory or shift) can result both in wage increase and (temporary) 
shortage at the same time.2 However, effects are very weak even in univariate 
equations not controlled for additional effects: companies reporting vacancies 
in 2015 had only 0.7 percentage point faster wage increases for 2015–2016 
than companies not complaining of shortages.
What is even more striking: complaints of shortage did not result in faster 
actual wage increase in any of the cases, compared to companies not report-
ing shortages – coefficients are positive in each case but not significant even 
at a 10 per cent level. It is partly due to the fact that planned and actual wage 
increases had a positive but loose relationship. When regressing the actual 
figures to the forecast (using a robust model again), the coefficient obtained 
is 0.31 and significant at 1 per cent level, that is, a one per cent faster planned 
wage increase was likely to result in an actual wage increase faster by only one-
third of a per cent.3
Ideally, the relationships touched upon herein should be investigated us-
ing a sample that allows more detailed analysis. However, such data are not 
available: at present, the merged database of the 2015 HLMF and the 2015 
and 2016 Wage Surveys is the largest, most recent and most reliable sample 
suitable for analysis. These data do not suggest a strong relationship between 
manifest shortage reported by firms and the pace of wage increase.
2 However, the qualitative re-
s u l t s  r e m a i n  t h e  s a m e 
when a variable for firm size is 
also included in the model.
3 Th is is not modifi ed by includ-
ing investment or company size.
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Table 3.3.3: The effect of the 2015 shortage indicators on the 2016 planned 
and 2015–2016 actual corporate average wage increase – robust regression 
coefficients
Effect on the The mean and the  
standard deviation  
of the shortage  
indicator
planned actual
wage increase measured  
at the logarithmic point
Are there vacancies?
0.007*** 0.003 0.172
(3.1) (0.32) ..
Proportion of vacancies
0.064** 0.105 0.007
(2.0) (0.66) (0.025)
Unable to fully utilise capacities due to the 
shortage of skilled workers (0/1)
0.004* 0.006 0.159
(1.8) (0.6) ..
Idle capacity due to the shortage of skilled 
workers (shortage)
0.016 0.134 0.009
(0.6) (1.0) (0.294)
Unable to fully utilise capacities due to the 
shortage of unskilled workers (0/1)
–0.000 –0.007 0.090
(0.1) (0.5) ..
Idle capacity due to the shortage of un-
skilled workers (proportion)
–0.013 0.041 0.005
(0.3) (0.2) (0.021)
The mean and the standard deviation of 
wage increase 0.022 0.076
Number of observations 869 869
Note: Dependent variables: shortage indicators. Actual wage increases were calcu-
lated based on the average wage level of the business sector in May 2015 and 2016.
Source: The merged database of the 2015 HLMF and the 2015 and 2016 Wage Sur-
veys.
Shortcuts for alleviating shortages
The above findings do not reveal everything about the impact of labour short-
age on wages (and other forms of remuneration) for several reasons. Firstly, 
due to the lack of data, it is not possible to assess the changes in the wage lev-
els of firms which do not face manifest shortage but still regard the workforce 
as a factor limiting their development. Secondly, the relationship between 
wage increase and shortage is not unidirectional: shortage in the past may 
lead to wage increase, which mitigates shortage. Simultaneity bias could only 
be avoided if we had variables which influence shortage but do not influence 
wage increase plans. However, we did not find such potential “instruments” 
in the available databases. Thirdly, some of the firms facing recruitment dif-
ficulties attempt to find solutions other than wage increase to alleviate short-
age. Less productive companies, unable to raise wages, are easily prompted by 
lack of prospects to find grey, unlawful solutions.
A wide range of firms may be tempted to do that. The value added per head 
is 50 per cent lower at Hungarian companies in manufacturing and 60 per 
cent lower at Hungarian companies in the construction industry and ICT 
services than at foreign-owned companies (HCSO, 2017). Some of the for-
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eign-owned companies – primarily the ones employing assemblers, machine 
operators and semi-skilled workers on the minimum wage – also offer below-
average wages and this circle is more characterised by the value added per head 
typical of Hungarian firms (Reszegi–Juhász, 2013). These firms find it diffi-
cult to raise wages without risking going under. However, if they do not raise 
wages, the disadvantages arising from low productivity cumulate in a tighter 
labour market. Their headcount decreases because of the workforce drain of 
more productive firms. This erodes their earlier investments, the number of 
their vacancies increase and so does the proportion of fixed costs, while their 
revenues decrease, reducing their investment opportunities, including pro-
ductivity enhancing investments, which would replace workforce. The only 
legal way for these firms would be development and innovation – they have 
also had the opportunity before, by relying on subsidised loans, for example 
in the Funding for Growth Scheme. Not having taken advantage of this op-
portunity suggests management problems. And firms trapped in a vicious cir-
cle are more likely to opt for grey or black, unlawful solutions.
This process is difficult to illustrate by data; thus we only provide some ad-
ditional input in order to describe it. The source of information is primarily 
interviews with executives and the examples also come from them.
“All the workers are fast like hell, I don’t want to work here”, said an entrant 
after the probationary period as a good-bye to the manager of an exceptionally 
productive factory although he was offered a gross salary of HUF 300 thou-
sand [about 970 Euro] for semi-skilled work. “I don’t dare to discipline work-
ers ignoring instructions because I’m afraid they’ll quit”, explains the executive 
of another company. “In autumn, there are so many workers on sick leave as if 
there was an epidemic – because it is harvest time. I know if someone is not 
ill but I don’t want to check on him otherwise he might quit, although this 
absenteeism breaks up production”, says the executive. The question of an ap-
plicant for a logistics job at the job interview: “Do I also have to pack goods 
and work with a forklift? I thought I’d just have to sit at the computer in the 
office all day”. “I must leave to earn more because workers are paid less here”, 
says a worker changing jobs every three or four years.
In addition to involuntary lenience with workers, unlawful ways also emerge, 
which owners blame on the struggle for survival, excusing themselves. Several 
firms do not register workers as a full-time, fully paid employee: the job is of-
ficially reported as a part-time job, while in reality it is full time and the dif-
ference is paid out off-the-books. This practice is frequent in trade, catering 
and hospitality. Overtime is often compensated in another way because pay-
ing it would be twice as expensive. “I didn’t understand why I have to tell the 
net pay to applicants at interviews. Then I asked a thirtysomething applicant 
who answered that because he had never been registered as a full time em-
ployee!” All these are paid out from unlawful sales, made without issuing an 
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invoice, or purchasing bills of costs, or from the dividends at best. If shortage 
becomes prevalent, this kind of unlawful behaviour will probably proliferate 
among less productive firms.
* * *
Considering that the direct analysis of the relationship between labour short-
age and wages, based on enterprise-level data, can only be performed using 
small samples and a limited set of variables, the next subchapter will explore 
indirectly, over a longer time-frame and based on individual data, whether 
the trends in wages reflect intensifying labour shortage.
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